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Abstract
In the context of a collective household choice model, we show that the
effects of improved credit access on search intensity by the unemployed are
heterogeneous across households and dependent on the within-household
bargaining power of the unemployed. We find empirical support for the
predictions of our model using a household survey conducted by the authors
in Cape Verde. These findings have important implications for the optimal
design of microfinance programs, in particular concerning the targeting of
loans and the use of microfinance as an instrument to support improved
labor market outcomes.
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1 Introduction
How does improved access to credit by poor households affects the labor market
behavior of the individuals in the household and, in particular, search effort by
the unemployed? We ask this question in the context of a model of collective
household behavior. We consider multi-member households in which at least one
member is unemployed and another member is an entrepreneur. The household
invests all its net-worth in the entrepreneurial activity. Improved access to credit
allows the household to invest in technology adoption, raising the return to the
household’s net-worth. We show that the impact on job search effort by the
unemployed depends crucially on the intra-household distribution of bargaining
and decision power. We find empirical support for the predictions of the model
using a household survey conducted in Cape Verde.
Targeting benefits to a particular household member (for example to women
instead of men) has been shown to have important effects on the ultimate use of
the corresponding resources (Cherchye et al., 2012). Blundell et al. (2005) label
this the targeting view. The upshot is that to analyse the way in which individual
behavior is affected by improved access to credit, we should model the household
as a collective of individuals rather than as a single unit. Thus, we develop
a model of job search and entrepreneurship that characterizes intra-household
allocations within a bargaining framework, as a Pareto efficient outcome. This
framework can address how the distribution of bargaining power affects both
consumption and effort choices within the household. The latter is crucial to
understand the labor market implications of improved access to credit by poor
families.
In particular, we show that the impact of improved access to credit on search
intensity by the unemployed is affected by two competing effects. Having access to
finance may raise search intensity, as it increases the return to the household’s net-
worth and, by finding a job, the unemployed worker raises the household’s net-
worth. But at the same time, unemployed individuals in households with better
access to finance enjoy a positive income effect that lowers the incentive to search.
Which effect dominates depends on the bargaining power of the unemployed
worker. We prove that when the bargaining power of the unemployed member
is high the positive net-worth effect is relatively stronger and, hence, improved
access to credit is more likely to raise search effort by the unemployed.
We test the predictions of our model using a tailored household survey conducted
by the authors in Cape Verde (an island country in the west coast of Africa)
in 2013, as part of a study commissioned by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP). The focus of the survey was the impact of microfinance loans
on household outcomes and, in particular, labor market outcomes. We make
use of unique detailed individual data on labor search behavior of unemployed
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individuals which allows us to test empirically the theoretical predictions. We
find robust support for the model’s predictions. The effects of improved credit
access on search intensity by the unemployed are found to be heterogeneous
across households and dependent on the within-household bargaining power of the
unemployed. The unemployed workers with high bargaining power increase their
search intensity if they live in a household with access to microfinance. Instead,
access to microfinance lowers search intensity among unemployed workers with
low bargaining power. We use as exogenous proxies for individual bargaining
power variables such as gender, schooling achievement, household size and the
individual role in the household.
Since expenditure is often observed at the household level, tests of intra-household
allocation models are often inferential, aimed at determining whether household
expenditure shares on various goods differ based on who controls income. In an
early contribution, Thomas (1990) shows that male and female non-labor incomes
(used as proxies for within household decision power) have different impact on
children health. Browning et al. (1994) look at how intrahousehold sharing is
affected by factors such as relative ages and incomes by focusing on expenditure
in items which are gender-specific like clothing. Looking at data from South
Africa, Duflo (2000) finds that the consequences of household revenue windfalls
on child nutrition strongly depend on the gender of the recipient. More recently,
Ashraf (2009), by looking at couples’ financial decisions in the Philipines, suggests
that above the gender dimension, it is control of financial decision that matters
most. In a recent experiment offering cheaper and more accessible bank accounts
in Kenya, Schaner (2013) further supports this idea, showing that responses to
the program varied according to whether both men and women were above or
below the median bargaining power and not according to gender solely.
Job search has been shown to be affected by wealth but also cash-on-hand and
credit constraints. Lentz and Tranas (2005) show that job search is monotonically
decreasing with wealth when the utility function is separable in consumption and
search effort. Furthermore, search effort exhibits positive unemployment duration
dependence as a direct implication of the negative relationship between search
effort and wealth. Card et al. (2007) estimate the excess sensitivity of job search
to cash-on-hand using sharp discontinuities in eligibility for severance pay and
extended unemployment insurance in Austria. Their findings provide important
implications for the efficiency of social insurance programs.
In our context, the microfinance institutions play an important role in relaxing
credit constraints faced by poor households. Relaxing credit constraints may
change the investment opportunities available to households but, at the same
time, may affect labor market outcomes depending on the distribution of decision
power within the household. For instance, in a recent paper Ngo and Wahhaj
(2012) develop a model of household production, bargaining and credit and show
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that if there is scope to invest loans in profitable joint activities women are most
likely to benefit from improved access to credit. Callen et al. (2014) look at
the effects of improved access to financial services on the incentives to provide
wage work. They conduct a natural experiment in Sri Lanka where improved
access to saving products is randomly assigned. They find that households work
more, and work more on the wage market when savings options improve. They
propose an explanation for their findings based on the fact that an increase in
the return to savings encourages more wage work. This effect is not dissimilar to
the mechanism we propose in our paper.
In the context of testing the effects of microfinance using models of collective
household choice, looking at the labor market behavior and, in particular, our
focus on the search intensity of the unemployed, is attractive because leisure is
a private good. Pitt and Khandker (1998) and also Morduch (1998) find that
participation in microcredit programs has heterogenous effects on labor supply,
depending on the borrower’s gender.
Likewise, our analysis provides important insights on positive and normative
issues concerning the design of microfinance programs and, in particular, the
targeting of microcredit. The improved access to credit by the poor that is
made possible by microfinance can affect labor market behavior in a positive way.
But this complementarity is not unconditional and depends crucially on how the
loans are targeted among heterogeneous households. Relaxing credit constraints
to poor households may have complementarities with improved labor market
outcomes but may also discourage the supply of wage labor. Which effect prevails,
depends on the targeting of loans. This result resonates with findings by Ahlin
et al. (2011) who find evidence of a rivalrous relationship between microfinance
and other modes of development and, in particular, workforce participation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of job search within
a collective household choice framework and derives the main proposition to be
tested. Section 3 describes the survey design and the data. Section 4 outlines
our estimation strategy and identification assumptions. Section 5 presents the
empirical results. Lastly, Section 6 concludes.
2 Credit and Labor Search: a theoretical framework
We examine the effects of improved access to credit on labor market outcomes,
in particular search intensity by the unemployed. We propose a model of job
search and household collective choice, in an environment with search frictions
and financial constraints. There are two periods, date 0 and date 1. A household
consists of a match between an entrepreneur and a wage laborer. The latter starts
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date 0 unemployed. As in Card et al. (2007), the labor market is characterized
with frictions and the unemployed worker must choose search intensity.
There are two types of households. Those with access to credit who are able
to borrow from a microfinance institution (MFI) and those without access to
credit. The former are able to finance an indivisible investment of size K, that
raises the return to the household’s entrepreneurial activity. Instead, creditless
households do not have enough net-worth to purchase the investment and, hence,
enjoy a lower return on their entrepreneurial activity, set to zero without loss of
generality.
2.1 Job Search with Collective Household Choice
We posit a collective model of household behavior by requiring the outcomes
of household choice to be Pareto efficient.1 This is implemented by assuming
that the household’s problem is represented by an objective function which is
a weighted sum of the private utility function of each household member; the
weights may be interpreted as the bargaining power of each individual in the
household as done, for example, in Anderson and Baland (2002), Blundell et al.
(2005) and Cherchye et al. (2012). Both household members enjoy utility from
consumption, and the unemployed worker dislikes searching for a job.
Let t denote the household type, with t = 0 for households without access to
credit, and t = 1 for households with access to credit (the treatment group). The
household type is pre-determined, known at date 0. The timing is as follows: at
the start of date 0, households choose the search effort of the unemployed worker,
S (t), and the household’s contingent consumption allocations. At the end of
date 0, those unemployed workers who successfully search and become employed
receive their wage W , and the households with access to credit borrow from the
MFI and invest the loan and all their net-worth in the high return technology. The
crucial feature of our model is the assumption that the unemployed individuals
who succeed in finding a job can contribute with their wage to the investment,
hence reducing the size of the loan. At date 1, households receive the returns
from the entrepreneurial activity, repay their loan and enjoy consumption.
The contingent consumption allocation is defined as:
Ce (t) =
(
Ĉe (t) , Ce (t)
)
,
Cn (t) =
(
Ĉn (t) , Cn (t)
)
,
(1)
where Ce (t) is the allocation in the event that the job search is successful while
1See, for example, Chiappori (1992) for a seminal contribution.
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Cn (t) is the allocation in the event that the wage laborer stays unemployed; Ĉ
is the consumption of the entrepreneur and C that of the wage laborer.
We normalize S (t) to equal the probability of finding a job by the unemployed
worker and always assume an interior solution, S (t) ∈ (0, 1). Following the
work by Card et al. (2007), we adopt two key simplifying assumptions: first, we
assume there is a single wage rate; and second we assume that utility is separable
in consumption and search effort and is represented by the utility function:
J (S,Ce,Cn; t) = αv (S (t)) + S
[
u
(
Ĉe (t)
)
+ αu
(
Ce (t)
)]
+ (1− S)
[
u
(
Ĉn (t)
)
+ αu
(
Cn (t)
)]
,
(2)
where we have normalized to one the weight placed on the entrepreneur’s utility
so that α > 0 represents the relative bargaining power of the unemployed worker.
The function v ( • ), is a quadratic function capturing the disutility from search,
and is decreasing and concave in the domain [0, 1]. The function u ( • ) is assumed
to be increasing, concave and homothetic, and to satisfy the condition u′′′ ( • ) ≥
0.2
Let R ≥ 1 be the gross return to investment, r ∈ [0, 1] be the market interest
rate and A the household’s financial assets at the start of date 0. In the second
period, when consumption takes place, the household total resources, Y (t), are
given by:
Ye (1) = RK − (1 + r) (K − A−W ) if the household has a loan
and the worker finds a job;
Yn (1) = RK − (1 + r) (K − A) if the household has a loan
and the worker does not find a job;
Ye (0) = A+W if the household does not have a loan
and the worker finds a job;
Yn (0) = A if the household does not have a loan
and the worker does not find a job;
(3)
The problem solved by the household is represented by the program:
max
S,Ce,Cn
J (S,Ce,Cn; t) ,
subject to Ĉi (t) + Ci (t) ≤ Yi (t) , i = e, n.
(4)
2The convex marginal utility case, i.e. u′′′ ( • ) ≥ 0, plays an important role in the theory
of precautionary saving (Kimball, 1990) and is a feature of the popular CRRA class of utility
functions.
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The optimality condition solving problem (4) are:
−αv′ (S (t)) =
[
u
(
Ĉe (t)
)
+ αu
(
Ce (t)
)]
−
[
u
(
Ĉn (t)
)
+ αu
(
Cn (t)
)]
, (5)
u′
(
Ĉe (t)
)
= αu′
(
Ce (t)
)
, (6)
u′
(
Ĉn (t)
)
= αu′
(
Cn (t)
)
. (7)
Since u ( • ) is homothetic and concave, conditions (6) and (7) combined imply:
Ĉe (1)
Ce (1)
=
Ĉn (1)
Cn (1)
=
Ĉe (0)
Ce (0)
=
Ĉn (0)
Cn (0)
= f (α) > 0, (8)
with f ′ (α) < 0. It follows that the optimality condition (5) can be expressed as
−αv′ (S (t)) = uˆ (Ce (t))− uˆ (Cn (t)) , (9)
where uˆi (C (t)) = u (C (t) f (α)) + αu (C (t)). It is easy to verify that if the
function u ( • ) is increasing, concave and has positive third derivative, then these
properties are inherited by the function uˆi ( • ), for any fixed α > 0.
2.2 Finance and Search Intensity
We first show that the impact that having access to micro-loans has on search
intensity by the unemployed is ambiguous, as there are two competing effects.
Having access to finance may raise search intensity, as it raises the return to the
household’s net-worth. But at the same time, households with access to finance
experience a positive income effect that lowers the incentive to search. The overall
effect depends on the concavity of the utility function.
For a given bargaining power parameter α, it follows from condition (8) and the
household budget constraint that
Cn (t) = (1 + f (α))
−1 Yn (t) and
Ce (t) = (1 + f (α))
−1 Ye (t) .
(10)
Define the function
∆ (Ce, Cn; t) = uˆ (Ce (t))− uˆ (Cn (t)) , (11)
such that the optimality condition for the choice of search intensity (9), can be
expressed as
−αv′ (S (t)) = ∆ (Ce, Cn; t) . (12)
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To identify the two competing effects of finance on job search intensity, take the
first-order Taylor expansion of ∆ (Ce, Cn; t) around
{C•e (t) , C•n (t)} =
{
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (t) , (1 + f (α))
−1 Yn (t)
}
(13)
and impose the budget constraint (10). This yields
∆˜ (α; t) =

uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (1)
) [
(1 + f (α))−1 (1 + r)W
]
, t = 1
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (0)
) [
(1 + f (α))−1W
]
, t = 0
(14)
with ∆˜ (α; t) that denotes the Taylor expansion of ∆ (Ce, Cn; t) around (13).
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Ignoring higher order terms,4 the optimality condition for the choice of search
intensity can be expressed as
−αv′ (S (t)) = ∆˜ (α; t) . (12′)
Thus, the effect of treatment on search intensity is given by
dS (t)
d t
= −d∆˜ (α; t)/d t
αv′′ (S (t))
, (15)
which is ambiguously signed because of
(
d∆˜ (α; t) /d t
)
. On the one hand,
(1 + f (α))−1 (1 + r)W > (1 + f (α))−1W, (16)
which raises ∆˜ (α; 1) relative to ∆˜ (α; 0), representing the net-worth effect. But,
on the other hand, because u′′ ( • ) < 0 and Yn (1) > Yn (0), we have that
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (1)
)
< uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (0)
)
, (17)
which lowers ∆˜ (α; 1) relative to ∆˜ (α; 0), representing the income effect; Since
v′′ ( • ) < 0, if the net-worth effect dominates we have that S (1) > S (0), while
the opposite is true if the income effect dominates.
Whereas the impact of improved finance on search intensity is ambiguous, the
model delivers a clear prediction for the relationship between the unemployed
worker’s bargaining power α, and the relative strengths of the net-worth and
income effects.
3See Appendix A for details.
4This is without loss of generality, since we want to show that the change in S (t) conditional
on treatment is ambiguously signed. For that, it suffices to show that the first order change in
∆ (Ce, Cn, t) is ambiguous.
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To see this first notice that, because v′′ (•) is a constant (v (•) is a quadratic
function), we have from (12′) that
S (1)
S (0)
=
∆˜ (α; 1)
∆˜ (α; 0)
=
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (1)
)
(1 + r)
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (0)
) . (18)
We are interested in the sign of the derivative
∂
(
S (1)/S (0)
)
∂α
= ∂
[
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (1)
)
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (0)
)] (1 + r)
∂α
=
[−f ′ (α) (1 + r)
(1 + f (α))2
]
×
[
uˆ′′ (Cn (1)) uˆ′ (Cn (0))Yn (1)− uˆ′′ (Cn (0)) uˆ′ (Cn (1))Yn (0)
uˆ′ (Cn (0))
2
]
> 0.
(19)
The derivative is positive since f ′ (α) < 0 and Cn (0) < Cn (1), which implies that
u′ (Cn (0)) ≥ u′ (Cn (1)) and u′′ (Cn (0)) ≤ u′′ (Cn (1)).5
The reason why the effect of improved access to credit on search is more positive
(or less negative) for individuals with higher bargaining power is because the
strength of the income effect is weaker if consumption is high. In turn, if the
bargaining power of the unemployed worker is high his/her consumption will be
relatively high, since he/she receives a higher fraction of the household resources.
Thus, the income effect is weaker and the net-worth effect dominates.
We, therefore, establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The effects of improved credit access on search intensity by the
unemployed are heterogeneous across households and dependent on the within-
household bargaining power of the unemployed. In particular:
1. Being part of a household with access to a loan exerts two competing effects
on the individual search intensity: the loan raises the return to job search,
since finding a job raises the household’s net-worth, which is more valuable
when the household has access to credit; but, receiving a loan implies a
positive income effect which discourages job search. The overall effect on
search intensity of an unemployed individual is ambiguous.
2. All else equal, the search intensity of an unemployed individual who is in
a household receiving a loan, relative to the search intensity of the same
individual if her household did not receive the loan, is increasing in the
bargaining power of the unemployed worker:
∂
(
S (1)/S (0)
)
∂α
> 0. (20)
5This follows from uˆ′′ ( • ) < 0 and uˆ′′′ ( • ) ≥ 0.
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The proposition suggests two observations. First, that the effect of treatment
on job search is ambiguous and hence, invites further empirical investigation.
Second, the model provides a clear testable prediction: as the bargaining power
of the unemployed member increases, the effect of improved access to finance on
search intensity should become more positive (or less negative). In the sequel, we
test this prediction using the survey data that we have collected in Cape Verde.
3 Survey Design and Data
We use data from a household survey undertaken by the authors in the Isle of
Santiago, Cape Verde, in 2013, as part of a broader project evaluating the impact
of microfinance in the country. We begin by describing the survey design and
sampling methods.
3.1 Survey Design and Sample
The original sample contains 600 households and is obtained using a stratified
random sampling technique. In particular, we are interested in labor market
outcomes and, since job and business opportunities differ considerably between
urban and rural settings, the principal dimension of stratification is whether
households live in an urban or rural area.
Thanks to detailed interviews to the main microfinance institutions that operate
in the country, we identify the areas where microfinance clients are more likely to
reside. In the capital city, Cidade da Praia, we chose 10 neighborhoods based on
their relevance for microfinance.6 We exclude the wealthier neighborhoods and
those where the employment rate is well above the national average as reported
in the 2010 National Census.
Our primary sampling unit in Cidade da Praia (urban stratum) are 20 randomly
selected census districts (CD) that overlap the selected neighborhoods.7 Each
CD contains 180 dwellings (and so approximately 180 households). Concerning
the stratum of rural households, we choose three areas characterized by high
population density and a large number of MFI clients, and randomly selected
10 CD in each of these areas.8 Finally, from each CD, both urban and rural,
we randomly select 20 households using maps provided by the national statistics
6The neighborhoods are Fazenda, Achadinha, Va´rzea, Terra Branca, Safende, Achada
Grande de Frente, Achada Grande de Tra´s, Ponta d’A´gua, Sa˜o Felipe and Achada de Santo
Anto´nio.
7Census Districts are precisely delimited geographical areas, drawn for the 2010 National
Census and covering the entire national territory.
8The selected areas are Assomada, Calheta de Sa˜o Miguel and Pedra Badejo
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Figure 1: Satellite picture of a census district (CD)
institute, like the one shown in Figure 1.9 Moreover, the households refusing
to be interviewed are very few and so are the households in which not a single
member is present.10 Given the CD design, this procedure guarantees that each
household has approximately the same probability of being interviewed.
The survey elicits detailed information on demographic characteristics, income,
consumption, assets and a complete recording of the financial services used by the
household, related to both microfinance and other forms of financial services. In
particular, we have information on all kinds of loan received by households (either
from conventional commercial banks or from an MFI). Thus, we can distinguish
four types of household in terms of access to credit: households without loans,
households that borrowed from an MFI, households that borrowed from banks
and households that borrowed from both banks and an MFI. In addition, we have
detailed information on the labor market participation of each member and, in
particular, on the job search effort by the unemployed and on the length of their
unemployment spell.
9The maps are satellite pictures that give a clear image of the border of the CD, the streets
and the location of dwellings. Each dwelling is marked by a dot. The images are of high
quality, but they do not allow assessing the quality, age and status of the buildings. The
enumerators were asked to abide by the following protocol: ‘Interview only the households in
the randomly selected dwellings marked on the maps; if a dwelling turns out to be abandoned,
go to the nearest one. If the dwelling hosts more than one household, select the first door to
the right’. Reassuringly, there are very few abandoned dwellings, probably because of the rapid
increase of the population in the isle of Santiago.
10This, is mainly due to the fact that many households still have a traditional structure and
are formed by different cohabiting generations (often, grandparents, parents and sons), so that
dwellings are rarely empty and there is always someone able to speak to visitors. Besides, it
testifies to the friendliness of Cabo Verdeans.
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Few restrictions are imposed on the original sample of surveyed households. First,
since we are interested in the effects of improved access to credit on the search
behavior of the unemployed, we drop households that have no members aged
between 16 and 65 years old who are unemployed. Second, we exclude households
that borrowed from both banks and an MFI.11 We are left with a sample of 317
households. The 317 households correspond to 1,100 individuals. Among the
1,100 individuals, 620 are employed and 480 unemployed.12
We restrict the sample further in the second stage, when we evaluate the impact
of improved credit access on the labor market behavior of the unemployed. First,
we exclude households with commercial bank loans. Second, to comply with the
common support assumption underlying Propensity Score Matching techniques
we exclude households with extreme propensity scores (probability of receiving
an MFI loan). Third, we exclude from the treated group the households who
received their MFI loan earlier than 2010.13 The sample in our main regression
analysis includes 262 unemployed individuals, corresponding to 191 households.
Individuals are defined as unemployed if they are between 16 and 65 and claim
to be unemployed, either looking for a job or not actively engaged in search (rest
unemployment).14
3.2 Preliminary Data Description
Table 1 describes the main characteristics of each household type, together with
the results from a difference in means test between the households with no loan
and those with access to finance, either through an MFI or through a bank.
The frequency of types is the same in urban and rural areas, indicating that
there are no ex-post differences in credit access across the two strata. Looking
at household size, we find that the households borrowing from either an MFI or
a bank are on average of larger size than the households with no loan. Among
MFI clients, the difference in size is reflected in the number of children below
working age which is significantly larger. An important indicator to understand
the targeting by the MFI is the fraction of households in which the head is a
woman. The MFI are often portrayed as targeting the women and, hence, we
11Only 12 households received loans from both an MFI and a bank.
12Specifically, as shown in Table 2, there are 315 unemployed individuals in households
without loan, 86 unemployed individuals in households with MFI loans and 79 unemployed
individuals in households with bank loans.
13This is to comply with the important assumption of our model that individuals know if
their household has access to finance when they choose their search effort. Since the MFI
typically have several repeated interactions with their clients, it is reasonable to assume that
those who recently received loans and did not default have easier access to finance.
14This is the appropriate definition of unemployment as we are interested in the effects of
improved access to credit on job search effort.
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Table 1: Characteristics of households with unemployed members
Household access to lending
1: no loan 2: MFI loan 3: bank loan 4: full sample
# of households 218 56 43 317
Rural household (%) 30 (0.03) 29 (0.06) 26 (0.07) 29 (0.03)
Household size 5.29 (0.17) 6.14** (0.35) 6.42*** (0.43) 5.59 (0.15)
# of children 15 or younger 1.55 (0.10) 2.04** (0.21) 1.51 (0.22) 1.63 (0.08)
Head is woman (%) 51 (0.03) 59 (0.07) 33** (0.07) 50 (0.03)
Age of head 49.33 (1.09) 48.46 (1.77) 52.58 (2.16) 49.62 (0.86)
Head’s schooling (years) 4.68 (0.27) 4.14 (0.51) 5.58 (0.63) 4.71 (0.22)
Spouse’s schooling (years) 4.78 (0.46) 5.15 (0.64) 4.79 (0.67) 4.84 (0.33)
Head is unemployed (%) 35 (0.03) 29 (0.06) 16*** (0.06) 31 (0.03)
Spouse is unemployed (%) 27 (0.03) 18 (0.05) 47** (0.08) 28 (0.03)
# of members self-employed 0.30 (0.04) 0.57*** (0.09) 0.28 ((0.09) 0.34 (0.03)
# of members unemployed 1.64 (0.06) 1.60 (0.10) 2** (0.18) 1.68 (0.05)
# of income sources 1.69 (0.08) 1.80 (0.15) 2.21*** (0.21) 1.77 (0.07)
Total annual income p.c. (CVE) 86,700 (8,637) 74,304 (12,182) 129,169* (22,146) 90,271 (7,032)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 51 (0.03) 57 (0.07) 28*** (0.07) 49 (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
may expect households headed by a woman to be more frequent among the MFI
clients. We find that 59% of the MFI households are headed by a woman while
this happens in 51% of the households without loans, but the difference is not
statistically significant. However, looking at the households that borrowed from
a conventional bank, we find that only 33% of them have a woman as head. Thus,
for households headed by a woman, the MFI offer significantly more viable access
to lending than the conventional banks. This finding confirms to some extent
the widely spread notion of the MFI targeting women. In terms of schooling
achievement, households are similar across types, with average schooling around
5 years.
Another variable of interest is self-employment. MFI in both urban and rural
areas typically give out loans to finance some form of business, either formal
or informal. One way to measure entrepreneurship is to look at the fraction
of households with at least one member self-employed. We find that 57% of
the households borrowing from an MFI have at least one member self-employed.
This is substantially more than among households borrowing from banks (28%)
and households not borrowing (30%). Turning to the number of unemployed
per household, we find an average of 1.68, with no significant differences among
microfinance and no-loan groups. The average number of unemployed individuals
is significantly higher for households borrowing from banks, as is the number of
income sources.15 Households without loans have on average 1.69 sources of
15Families with bank loans have higher income than families borrowing from the MFI. The
higher unemployment rate among this group suggests that leisure is a normal good. This is
consistent with our definition of unemployment, that includes rest unemployment.
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Table 2: Individual level characteristics of unemployed
Household type
1: no loan 2: MFI loan 3: full sample
# of individuals 315 86 401
Female (%) 64 (0.03) 61 (0.05) 63 (0.02)
Age 33 (0.73) 31 (1.40) 33 (0.65)
Schooling (years) 6.67 (0.24) 6.90 (0.46) 6.71 (0.21)
Owns mobile phone (%) 63 (0.03) 57 (0.05) 61 (0.03)
Owns bank account (%) 30 (0.03) 33 (0.05) 31 (0.03)
Is looking for a job (dummy) (%) 51 (0.03) 45 (0.05) 50 (0.03)
Job search intensity 0.86 (0.06) 0.71 (0.09) 0.83 (0.05)
# of initiatives to search for job 0.55 (0.04) 0.58 (0.08) 0.56 (0.04)
Unemployment duration: 1 — 6 months (%) 18 (0.02) 13 (0.04) 17 (0.02)
Unemployment duration: 7 — 12 months (%) 12 (0.02) 4** (0.02) 10 (0.02)
Unemployment duration: 1 to 4 y (%) 32 (0.03) 33 (0.05) 32 (0.03)
Unemployment duration: more than 4 y (%) 26 (0.03) 40** (0.05) 29 (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
income, while the value is 1.80 for those with micro-loans. The standard errors
are small, indicating very little dispersion. Thus, it is fair to say that the stylized
representation of the household in Section 2, as a match between an entrepreneur
and an unemployed worker, is not far from the typical household in our sample.
On average, households have one or two members unemployed and one or two
sources of income.
The incidence of poverty is pervasive in our sample, in particular among the
households with no access to finance and with micro-loans, our core sample. This
is confirmed by the poverty head-count, showing 28% of households with bank
loans below the poverty line, with the share rising to 57% among MFI borrowers
and 51% among households with no loans.16
Table 2 reports individual characteristics of interest of the unemployed individuals
aged between 16 and 65 that are members of households in the treatment and
in the control group (hence, after the exclusion of households borrowing from
banks). It is interesting to notice that unemployed individuals from households
with no loans are very similar to unemployed individuals from MFI households,
16Since no recent information in this respect is available, we updated the 2007 national
poverty line (World Bank, 2007) by taking into account the inflation over the period 2007-2013.
We attain an income value of 55,319 CVE per capita per year which is roughly equivalent to 2
US$ per capita per day in PPP. Households are considered poor if their income per capita per
day is lower than 2 US$.
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Table 3: Loan characteristics of treated households
Descriptives
# of households 56
Number of loans per hh 1,7
Female clients (%) 83
Main use of the loan: business related (%) 82.5
Loan size (average) (CVE) 62,200
Loan size (median) (CVE) 50,000
Loan duration (months) 8
Default rate (%) 8
Difficulty to repay (%) 6
especially for job search measures.17 Another interesting observation is that there
is a significantly higher share of long-term unemployment (unemployment spells
longuer than 4 years) among members of households borrowing from an MFI,
but lower medium term unemployment.
Finally, some characteristics of the micro loans taken by the treated households
are displayed in Table 3. First, it can be seen that women represent a high
proportion of clients, at 83%. The microfinance loan was taken for business
related purposes in 82.5% of the cases (to start a business, expand it, buy goods
for petty trade or buy work equipment), which is consistent with the intrinsic
objective of microfinance to promote entrepreneurship. Looking at the loan size,
we see that the distribution is right skewed, the average amount lent being higher
than the median.18 Finally, looking at loan performance, only 8% of clients
defaulted and 6% had difficulties in repaying the loan.19
17The job search measures constructed are the following three: Is looking for a job; Labor
search intensity ; and Number of initiatives to search for work. The first, Is looking for a job,
is a discrete variable taking value 1 if the unemployed individual has taken any initiative to
find a job in the previous four weeks and 0 otherwise; The second, Labor search intensity is an
ordinal variable capturing the intensity of labor search. It takes value 0 if the individual did
not take any initiatives to find job; 1 if the individual searched a job on the internet, asked
help from friends, family or worker union, or registered in a job center; and 2 if she asked an
employer for work, took part in a job selection process or responded to a job offer. The rational
of this variable is to rank the amount of effort needed for the different types of initiatives in the
context of Cape Verde. Number of initiatives to search for work is a cardinal variable taking
the values 0, 1, 2 or 3 depending on the number of different initiatives taken to find a job.
18The median loan size is equal 588 $US. 1 US dollar is roughly equal to 85 Cape Verdean
Escudo (CVE), the national currency.
19A loan is considered in default if it is still ongoing 3 months after the due date.
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4 Estimation Strategy and Identification Assumptions
In this Section we introduce the econometric model used to assess the effects of
improved access to credit on job search. The main purpose of the analysis is to
test Proposition 1 and, in particular, the prediction in Equation (20). We seek
to estimate the impact of household borrowing from an MFI on the job search
effort by the unemployed household members: the Average Treatment Effect for
the Treated (ATT).
Formally, Y (1) is the outcome, job search effort, for an individual in a household
borrowing from an MFI and Y (0) the outcome for an individual in a household
without microfinance access. Let t be the indicator of treatment, with t = 1 if the
household has received a microfinance loan and t = 0 if it has not. We wish to
evaluate the difference between the outcome of individuals in treated households
and the counterfactual outcome of the same group of individuals had they not
received the loan, given a vector X of observable characteristics
ATT = E [Y (1) | X, t = 1]− E [Y (0) | X, t = 1] . (21)
The evaluation problem lies in the fact that, for each individual, only one of either
Y (1) or Y (0) are observed. In particular, for individuals in households with
t = 1, only Y (1) is observed. We need a counterfactual based on the observable
outcome of the non-treated households, built in such a way to be as close as
possible to the theoretical outcome for individuals in treated household in the
absence of treatment. The obvious candidate is to use the outcome of individuals
in the non-treated households, E [Y (0) | X, t = 0], as a counterfactual. However,
an evaluation based on differences in means is subject to various sources of bias
when treatment is not randomly assigned and is, instead, determined by multiple
household characteristics such as schooling, entrepreneurial spirit and ability.
In their seminal paper, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) propose a method that
corrects for potential selection and omitted variable bias in estimating ATT.
They show that, under the assumption of conditional independence, adjusting
for differences between treated and control units in the propensity score removes
all biases associated with differences in the observed covariates in the treated and
control groups. The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of
receiving an MFI loan:
p(X) = Prob (t = 1 | X), (22)
where X are observed covariates, which are assumed to be pre-determined.20
20The conditional independence assumption, or unconfoundedness property, requires that,
conditional on the observed covariates, receiving treatment (having an MFI loan) is independent
of the potential outcomes (the search intensity) with and without the treatment, Y1 and Y0. This
implies not only that participation in the program is based entirely on observed characteristics,
but also that average differences in outcomes between treated and control units with the same
observed characteristics are attributable to the treatment, so that t⊥Y (1) , Y (0) | X.
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For each household j, the estimated propensity score p̂(Xj) is estimated based
on a range of observable pre-program household characteristics, collected in the
vector Xj. The access to credit is modeled at the household level as we want to
distinguish between the households who borrow from the MFI and those that do
not. Thus, we include only household level covariates in the probability model.21
Hirano et al. (2003) extend Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)’s result and show
that, under the conditional independence assumption, weighting observations by
p̂(X)/ (1− p̂(X)) for the control units, where p̂(X) is a consistent estimator of
p(X), and by unity for the treated units, leads to an efficient estimator of the
ATT. The intuition is that the control households with observables very similar
to the treated households are assigned higher weights, while those relatively more
dissimilar are assigned lower weights. The weighs function is given by
ω(t,X) = t+ (1− t) p̂ (X)
1− p̂ (X) . (23)
The construction of the weights ensures that, under the conditional independence
assumption, requiring tj and εij to be independent, the observed predictors of
treatment Xj are uncorrelated with tj and, hence, the weighted estimator is
consistent.
Similarly to Blattman and Annan (2010) we follow Imbens (2004) suggestion of
combining weighting methods and regression methods with fixed effects or added
covariates. This is particularly useful to evaluate the impact of the treatment
but also of other covariates and their interactions. In particular, we estimate the
following equation:
Yij = β0 + β1tj + β2tjαij + β3Zij + εij, (24)
where Yij refers to the labor search behavior of individual i in household j, tj
denotes the treatment, defined as the household j having received at least one
microfinance loan since 2010, and αij is a proxy for individual i’s within-household
bargaining power. Individual and household level controls are collected in Zij,
which also includes the individual’s bargaining power αij (see bottom of Table 5
for a complete list of the control variables).
Testing Proposition 1 and, in particular, Equation (20) boils down to testing the
null hypothesis that β2 is positive. A positive and significant β2 would confirm the
presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, increasing in the bargaining power of
the unemployed. In turn, as implied by the first part of Proposition 1, we have no
21We check the sensitivity of our results to deviations from the conditional independence
assumption (CIA) by simulating a potential confounder in order to assess the robustness of the
estimated treatment effects following the methodology proposed by Ichino et al. (2008). The
estimated ATT with various specifications for the confounding factors change by less than 5%
from the baseline findings.
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Table 4: Multinomial probit model at the household level (first stage)
MFI Loan Bank Loan
(1) (2)
# of hh members 0.103 (0.081) 0.267*** (0.087)
# of children 15 or younger 0.080 (0.131) -0.227 (0.142)
Hh owns house −0.613** (0.307) 0.636 (0.421)
Hh has family abroad 0.718** (0.317) 0.329 (0.309)
# of times per week reads journal 0.215 (0.291) 0.233 (0.274)
Head - primary school 0.081 (0.672) 0.657 (0.630)
Head - high-school −0.155 (0.818) 0.694 (0.746)
Head - college 0.353 (1.068) 2.485*** (0.868)
Parent of head was self-employed 0.416 (0.325) 0.656* (0.362)
Head has a partner −0.073 (0.310) 0.862** (0.353)
Head is separated 0.273 (0.795) −10.715*** (0.704)
Head is widower −0.150 (0.503) 0.960 (0.626)
Head can read or write −1.154* (0.603) −0.753 (0.499)
Head is from Santiago 0.349 (0.332) 0.577 (0.395)
Head is foreigner 0.660 (0.906) −11.086*** (0.958)
Head is woman −0.285 (0.316) −0.562* (0.334)
Age of head 0.041 (0.056) 0.035 (0.059)
Age of head squared −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
Constant −2.947** (1.501) −4.870*** (1.621)
Log pseudo likelihood −211.706
Wald Chi2 5485.790
Prob > Chi2 0.000
Neighborhood fixed effects yes
Observations 317
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
theoretical prediction concerning the sign of β1. Nonetheless, estimating precisely
β1 is important as it has implications in terms of how the current targeting of
credit to poor households contributes to improving labor market outcomes.
5 Microfinance and Job Search: Empirical Findings
We now turn to the empirical analysis to compare the theoretical predictions of
our model with the data. The first step, described in Section 5.1 is to model the
probability of receiving a microfinance loan at the household level and estimate
the propensity scores. Then, in Section 5.2, we use the propensity scores as
weights in the individual level regressions, with weights as in Equation (23).
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5.1 First Stage: Estimation of the Propensity Scores
Our focus is on borrowing by the poor (the households targeted by the MFI).
Hence, we exclude the households that borrow from conventional banks when
we estimate Equation (24). However, to have a complete model of access to
credit it is important in the first stage to include the households borrowing from
conventional banks and to distinguish them from households who borrow from the
MFI. Excluding borrowing from conventional banks in the first stage would lead
to a biased estimation of the propensity score due to model miss-specification.22
Therefore, we estimate a multinomial probit model allowing for three possible
household statuses: receiving a loan from an MFI, receiving a loan from a bank
and not receiving any loan.23
As explained in the previous Section, the identification of the causal impact of the
treatment is based on the assumption that allocation of the treatment is purely
random among households with the same estimated propensity score, conditional
on the pre-treatment characteristics. Hence, the participation equation includes
variables that control for the participation and outcomes of interest but are not
affected by the treatment. The estimated model is shown in Table 4.
The propensity score estimation enables us to predict the probability of getting
access to microcredit at the household level. Figure 2 gives the kernel density
of the estimated propensity scores for treated and non-treated households. As
can be seen, there is substantial overlap in the distribution of the propensity
scores of both treated and non-treated households. However, to better enforce
the common support condition, in what follows we exclude individuals in treated
households whose household’s probability of treatment exceeds the maximum
probability among the untreated households and individuals in the untreated
households whose probability of participating is bellow the minimum probability
of participation of treated households. The upshot is that we keep observations
with propensity scores such that 0.038 ≤ p̂(x) ≤ 0.704.
22For example, households without loans but that would if they wanted be able to borrow
from conventional banks have very different characteristics than poor households unable to
borrow. It is, therefore, important to include borrowing from a conventional banks as a possible
household status when modeling access to credit.
23While being computationally heavier, the multinomial probit model is based on weaker
assumptions than the multinomial logit. In particular, it does not rely on the independence of
irrelevant alternatives assumption which allows for the correlation of household access to each
available category. See Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a
discussion of modeling propensity scores in multiple discrete dependent variables settings.
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Figure 2: Propensity score distribution
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5.2 Second Stage: Labor Search Model
We now turn to the estimation of the main regression equation (24). Our survey
asks households if they have ever received a microfinance loan, how many times
and when. The treated group, tj = 1, are those households that received at least
one microfinance loan since 2010. We exclude from the sample the households
who received the last loan earlier because they may no longer have access to
microfinance.24 In turn, households who never had any loan are used to form the
control group, for which tj = 0. We are left with 262 unemployed individuals
distributed among 191 households.
The dependent variable, Yij, is the job search effort by the unemployed. We
use three alternative measures of labor search effort.25 Firstly, we use a discrete
variable taking value 1 if the unemployed individual has taken any initiative to
find a job in the previous four weeks and 0 otherwise. We call the regression
equation with this dependent variable Model 1. Secondly, we use an ordered
discrete variable capturing the intensity of labor search, denoted Model 2. Finally,
24In the model, unemployed workers may decide to search more intensively to raise the
household’s net-worth and lower the size of the loan needed to be able to invest. So the treated
households are those that are going to borrow from an MFI. Instead, given the nature of our
survey we must identify the treated households as those who have already borrowed from an
MFI. We think this is justified because the typical use of the MFI loans is to finance working
capital (see Table 3), and households have repeated interaction with the MFI institution. Thus,
households who have borrowed in the past are likely to borrow again so that the net-worth
channel described in the model is relevant. However, if the household did not borrow from
an MFI for a long time, this assumption is no longer appropriate. This is why we exclude
households that did not borrow from an MFI since before 2010.
25See footnote 17.
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we use an ordered discrete variable corresponding to the number of initiatives
taken to search for a job, denoted Model 3.
We want to test Proposition 1 and, in particular, Equation (20) predicting that
the search intensity of an unemployed member of a household with an MFI loan
compared to that of an unemployed in a household with no loan increases in the
individual’s bargaining power αij. But bargaining power is unobservable and,
hence, must be proxied by some observable variables. The literature has proposed
several measures of bargaining including income, employment, asset ownership
and assets brought to marriage.26 In our context, we must also make sure that
our measure of bargaining power is exogenous and, in particular, unaffected by
the treatment.27 Therefore, we select only pre-determined variables as measures
of bargaining power.
We use the following variables: Household size, which we assume to be negatively
correlated with bargaining power since, all else equal, the larger the household,
the lower the share of resources received by each member; Gender, which, in line
with numerous studies of intra-household resource allocation, should capture the
disadvantages often faced by women; Schooling, which we assume to be negatively
correlated with bargaining power since human capital affects not only individual
consumption but also their outside option; Father’s schooling, which we assume
is positively correlated with the bargaining power of their offspring, for instance,
in the marriage market; Role of the individual in the household, since we expect
the head of the household to have a higher bargaining power.
5.3 Access to Credit and Job Search: Baseline Findings (Model 1)
We now turn to the paper’s main empirical findings. Table 5 shows the results
of Model 1. For all regressions reported below we account for dependence be-
tween observations by computing robust standard errors. We first estimate the
model without re-weighting and without allowing for heterogeneity in the treat-
ment effects, reported in Column 1. This amounts to estimating a standard
Probit model. We compare the estimated coefficient β1 with the one obtained
using the inverse probability weighting (IPW), reported in Column 2. While the
unweighted β1 coefficient is positive (but not statistically significant), the IPW
estimate is negative and statistically significant and, hence, there is evidence of a
26Several of these proxys are discussed in, for example, Lundberg and Pollak (1996),
Quisumbing and de la Brie`re (2000), Friedberg and Webb (2006) and Doss (2013).
27Something which we do not explore in this paper is how bargaining power is determined.
However, the bargaining power of each household member is likely not invariant to the set
of investment opportunities available to each member. This point is made by Tassel (2004).
For this reason, in the empirical investigation we only consider pre-determined measures of
bargaining power.
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positive selection bias. This is what we would expect if, for example, the MFI are
able to select households where the unemployed are more diligent in searching for
work. The sign of the IPW coefficient implies that the average treatment effect
of MFI lending on the incentives for job search by the unemployed is negative.
However, given Proposition 1, we are especially interested in the heterogeneity in
treatment effects, which is what we look at next.
We allow for heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the treatment variable
with our proxies for bargaining power (Columns 3 to 7). There is robust evidence
of heterogeneous treatment effects consistent with Proposition 1. All interaction
coefficients are significant and of the expected sign. Being a woman, as well as
being a member of a larger household, which are both associated with smaller
bargaining power, lower the treatment effect. Instead the effects of own schooling
and father’s schooling, and of being the household head, each associated with
a larger bargaining power, is positive and precisely estimated. For all except
one specification (in Column 3), the coefficient β1 is estimated to be negative,
indicating a negative average treatment effect of improved access to credit on
search effort by the unemployed.
These findings suggest that there is scope for improving labor market outcomes
by better targeting microfinance programs. In particular, improving the access
to credit by households whose unemployed members are more likely to exhibit
positive treatment effects on job search, which are those with stronger bargaining
power, can potentially improve aggregate labor market outcomes in frictional
markets. This is a hitherto unexplored channel through which microfinance may
have aggregate benefits.
A potential caveat in interpreting our findings is that we only sample individuals
currently unemployed. There may be individuals who were unemployed at the
time of the loans but that have since found work. In expectation these are
the individuals who raise their search effort by a greater amount following the
treatment. The upshot is that if the treatment effect is positive, our estimate
would be downward biased. Similarly, if the treatment effect is negative we
would undersample individuals from the control group and our estimate would
be upward biased. Thus, the magnitude of our estimated ATT may suffer from
an attenuation bias and as such should be interpreted as a lower bound on the
magnitude of the ATT.28
28We check the sensitivity of our results to deviations from the conditional independence
assumption (CIA) by simulating a potential confounder in order to assess the robustness of the
estimated treatment effects following the methodology proposed by Ichino et al. (2008). The
estimated ATT with various specifications for the confounding factors change by less than 5%
from the baseline findings.
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Table 5: Access to microcredit and labor search (Model 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI 0.026 −0.932** 0.830 −0.279 −2.097***−2.868***−0.905** −1.024**
(0.310) (0.446) (0.806) (0.486) (0.730) (0.613) (0.438) (0.416)
MFI × Household Size −0.268**
(0.106)
MFI × Female (dummy) −1.002*
(0.583)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.179**
(0.070)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 2.906***
(0.668)
MFI × Head (dummy) 2.559***
(0.959)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 0.981***
(0.355)
Household size 0.155** 0.183** 0.319*** 0.170* 0.167** 0.165* 0.146* 0.133
(0.066) (0.090) (0.109) (0.089) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.087)
Female (dummy) −0.706***−0.480 −0.298 −0.106 −0.566* −0.513 −0.445 −0.476
(0.216) (0.336) (0.358) (0.355) (0.334) (0.321) (0.332) (0.328)
Schooling (years) −0.002 0.054 0.046 0.064 −0.035 0.063 0.035 0.007
(0.031) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048)
Father School (dummy) −0.035 −0.293 −0.470 −0.320 −0.250 −1.621***−0.307 −0.586*
(0.218) (0.300) (0.302) (0.302) (0.301) (0.394) (0.300) (0.313)
Head (dummy) −0.055 0.935** 1.162*** 0.824* 0.722 0.642 0.526 0.755*
(0.314) (0.452) (0.442) (0.443) (0.483) (0.441) (0.518) (0.450)
Unemp. duration: 7 - 12 m 0.868*** 0.814 0.670 0.837* 1.070** 0.986* 0.784 1.128**
(0.327) (0.550) (0.516) (0.505) (0.481) (0.508) (0.515) (0.502)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.612*** 0.516 0.415 0.562* 0.470 0.691** 0.438 0.619*
(0.227) (0.314) (0.294) (0.290) (0.304) (0.335) (0.319) (0.329)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y −0.645** −0.317 −0.388 −0.330 −0.398 −0.324 −0.471 −0.290
(0.262) (0.355) (0.339) (0.349) (0.359) (0.351) (0.359) (0.369)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R-squared 0.306 0.584 0.598 0.591 0.602 0.642 0.598 0.607
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts
with family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level
controls: Age, Age2, Country or Island of Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Owner-
ship of Bank Account (dummy) and an indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Table 6: Access to microcredit and labor search (Model 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI −0.060 −0.780* 1.528* −0.139 −2.167*** −2.787*** −0.750* −1.028***
(0.265) (0.400) (0.837) (0.434) (0.667) (0.575) (0.383) (0.395)
MFI × Household Size −0.349***
(0.116)
MFI × Female (dummy) −1.140**
(0.569)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.199***
(0.065)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 3.048***
(0.640)
MFI × Head (dummy) 1.397*
(0.836)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 1.201***
(0.376)
Household size 0.012 −0.117 0.016 −0.109 −0.104 −0.094 −0.128 −0.124
(0.055) (0.089) (0.098) (0.089) (0.083) (0.0818) (0.0865) (0.0845)
Female (dummy) −0.727***−0.547* −0.268 −0.192 −0.631** −0.380 −0.506* −0.507*
(0.195) (0.296) (0.314) (0.336) (0.299) (0.290) (0.304) (0.286)
Schooling (years) 0.024 0.084** 0.070* 0.094**−0.004 0.080** 0.066 0.032
(0.027) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Father school (dummy) 0.113 0.089 −0.322 −0.032 0.087 −1.245*** 0.138 −0.351
(0.191) (0.298) (0.307) (0.303) (0.291) (0.360) (0.297) (0.309)
Head (dummy) −0.032 0.729* 1.200*** 0.591 0.261 0.609 0.239 0.530
(0.290) (0.409) (0.436) (0.393) (0.437) (0.377) (0.536) (0.388)
Unemp. duration: 7 − 12 m 0.601** −0.053 −0.025 −0.081 0.521 0.099 0.043 0.387
(0.276) (0.410) (0.416) (0.391) (0.421) (0.388) (0.385) (0.412)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.414** 0.590* 0.676** 0.652** 0.591* 0.861** 0.540 0.743**
(0.210) (0.336) (0.339) (0.321) (0.334) (0.342) (0.341) (0.343)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y −0.562** −0.188 −0.035 −0.193 −0.236 −0.185 −0.329 −0.135
(0.253) (0.371) (0.394) (0.370) (0.378) (0.359) (0.373) (0.375)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R−squared 0.206 0.419 0.441 0.429 0.443 0.482 0.426 0.453
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts with
family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level con-
trols: Age, Age2, Country or Island of Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Ownership of
Bank Account (dummy) and an indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Table 7: Access to microcredit and labor search (Model 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI 0.171 −0.379 0.500 0.134 −0.976 −2.042***−0.332 −0.597
(0.273) (0.360) (0.769) (0.440) (0.761) (0.513) (0.342) (0.376)
MFI × Household Size −0.130
(0.097)
MFI × Female (dummy) −0.897
(0.613)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.081
(0.078)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 2.408***
(0.604)
MFI × Head (dummy) 1.698**
(0.698)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 0.697**
(0.353)
Household size 0.053 −0.033 0.022 −0.0223 −0.031 −0.016 −0.058 −0.039
(0.055) (0.068) (0.0816) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.066)
Female (dummy) −0.598***−0.297 −0.175 0.009 −0.348 −0.096 −0.238 −0.279
(0.195) (0.300) (0.292) (0.308) (0.310) (0.299) (0.308) (0.305)
Schooling (years) 0.023 0.053 0.047 0.061 0.016 0.051 0.036 0.021
(0.025 (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043)
Father School (dummy) 0.006 0.054 −0.082 −0.082 0.053 −1.041*** 0.053 −0.206
(0.178) (0.234) (0.234) (0.259) (0.235) (0.300) (0.229) (0.255)
Head (dummy) 0.025 0.986*** 1.147*** 0.902** 0.801* 0.844** 0.444 0.856**
(0.283) (0.381) (0.404) (0.365) (0.432) (0.344) (0.475) (0.366)
Unemp. duration: 7 − 12 m 0.506* 0.241 0.221 0.322 0.477 0.447 0.315 0.569
(0.273) (0.466) (0.477) (0.468) (0.522) (0.504) (0.464) (0.511)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.471** 0.203 0.200 0.298 0.204 0.417 0.157 0.307
(0.200) (0.370) (0.381) (0.372) (0.377) (0.396) (0.378) (0.394)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y −0.494** −0.038 −0.022 −0.040 −0.047 −0.036 −0.201 0.017
(0.244) (0.408) (0.417) (0.412) (0.412) (0.409) (0.414) (0.429)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R−squared 0.207 0.381 0.386 0.389 0.386 0.434 0.393 0.396
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts
with family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy).Additional individual level
controls: Age, Age2, Country or Island of Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Owner-
ship of Bank Account (dummy) and an indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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5.4 A Composite Measure of Intra-household Bargaining Power
Each of our proxies for bargaining power captures a different underlying feature of
the intra-household distribution of resources and is, therefore, a partial measure.
In order to construct a more comprehensive measure of bargaining power, we use
a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) that aggregates the information scattered
in the different variables we used (Pearson, 1901; Hotelling, 1933).29 Since, for
the PCA method to be valid, the included variables should have a multivariate
normal distribution (or at least be continuous), and since we want to include a
combination of dichotomous and continuous variables (gender, own and father’s
schooling, age, and household size), we perform a polychoric correlation analysis
(Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004).
This is implemented as follows. The pairwise correlations between variables are
estimated based on the nature of the variable: Pearson moment correlation if the
two variables are continuous, Polychoric correlation if the two variables are ordinal
and Polyserial correlation if one variable is ordinal and the other continuous. This
allows us to run a principal component analysis on the resulting correlation matrix
and interpret the first principal component as an index of bargaining power.
For Model 1, results are presented in Column (8) of Table 5 and confirm the
theoretical predictions: the treatment effect on job search intensity is increasing
with the intra-household bargaining power of the unemployed worker.
5.5 Alternative Measures of Search Effort (Model 2 and 3)
Next, we replicate the empirical analysis with our alternative measures of job
search effort: the labor search intensity (Model 2) and the number of labor search
initiatives (Model 3).
The estimation results from Model 2 are shown in Table 6. In this case, the
dependent variable is an ordered discrete indicator of the intensity of job search,
hence we run an ordered Probit model. In turn, the specification of the regression
equation and the computation of the regression weights are as in the baseline
model. Looking at the weighted regression estimates of the coefficient β2 for each
measure of bargaining power, the estimated coefficient have the same sign and
are precisely estimated.
Finally, in Model 3, we use as a dependent variable the discrete indicator of the
number of job-search initiatives undertaken by the unemployed. The results are
shown in Table 7. The precision of the estimates for this specification is lower.
Nonetheless, the evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects remains consistent
29See Filmer and Pritchett (2001) for an early and influential paper in development economics
and population studies constructing socio-economic indices using PCA.
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Figure 3: Average marginal effects across bargaining power
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with Proposition 1, in particular for the schooling of the father, the dummy
indicating that the individual is the head of the household and the composite
measure of bargaining power. We conclude that the evidence of heterogeneous
treatment effects consistent with the theoretical prediction are robust to changes
in the measure of search effort.
5.6 Discussion of the Results: Marginal Effects
To gain a better sense of the magnitude of the heterogeneous treatment effects
estimated under the baseline specification (Model 1), we compute the marginal
effect of each interaction term. These are shown in Figure 3, together with their
confidence intervals.
Each panel shows the treatment effect on job search as the bargaining power,
measured by each proxy, changes. The upper left panel reports the marginal
effect on job search as the individual’s household size increases. The maintained
assumption is that, all else equal, an unemployed individual in a large household
receives a low share of resources and, hence, has a lower decision weight αij. Thus,
the figure demonstrates that the treatment effect varies with household size in a
way which is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Receiving an MFI loan
lowers the probability of unemployed workers searching for jobs if the household
size is greater than 3. The estimated negative marginal effect is statistically
significant for unemployed individuals living in household of 8 members or more.
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Table 8: Bargaining proxys distribution among individuals of treated households
Percentile
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Household size 3 5 6 7 12
Gender man man woman woman woman
Years of schooling 0 4 9 12 12
Father went to school? no no yes yes yes
Unemployed head of household? no no no no yes
Selected percentiles for the sample of treated households (those receiving a microfinance loan).
The number of unemployed individuals in treated households is 45, roughly 17% of the sample.
Table 8 shows the distribution of each bargaining power proxy among the treated
households. This information allows measuring the fraction of households that
borrow from an MFI and with unemployed members for which the treatment is
predicted to raise job search. For instance, only around 5% of the households
with an MFI loan have fewer than 4 members. Thus, in most treated households,
everything else equal, the bargaining power of the unemployed individuals is
judged low because of the large household size. The upshot is that for those
individuals, the treatment effect on job search effort is negative. The implications
of this result for the optimal design of microfinance programs are interesting. The
size of the household and, in particular, the number of children may be positively
correlated with poverty. Hence, targeting large families may be desirable for the
MFI with social objectives.30 However, our results suggest that by targeting loans
to smaller households, the contribution of microfinance to improving aggregate
labor market outcomes would be raised. This is because the relative bargaining
power of each individual is higher in smaller sized families.
The same analysis can be conducted for each measure of bargaining power. For
example, considering gender, the second panel of Figure 3 shows that if the
unemployed worker is a woman, receiving an MFI loan lowers the probability of
job search by 20 percentage points. If, instead, the man is unemployed, the effect
of receiving a loan on the job search is negligible. This is, once again, exactly
what is predicted by Proposition 1 if we assume that woman have on average a
lower intra-household bargaining power. But, Table 8 shows that more than 50%
of the treated households have unemployed workers who are women. For those
households, receiving a loan lowers the job search by the unemployed members
in the household. Once again, there is scope to improve targeting to support
30On the other hand, there is some evidence that larger families are not necessarily poorer.
For instance, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) show that taking into account scale economies can
substantially lower poverty estimates among large families. Instead, Alkire and Santos (2014)
shows that poor households are indeed likely to have more children.
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better aggregate labor market outcomes: targeting lending to households in which
women are (self-) employed and men are unemployed. This would support the
entrepreneurial activity of the household and at the same time raise the incentive
for job search by the husband.
The heterogeneity in treatment effects is striking when we compare unemployed
workers who are the head of the household to those who are not. If the household
head is unemployed, receiving an MFI loan is associated with a 20 percentage
points increase in the probability of job search. If, instead, the unemployed is
not the head of household, the treatment lowers the probability of job search
by 20 percentage points.31 Looking at Table 8, the targeting seems, once again,
suboptimal. Only about 5% of unemployed individuals in treated households are
the head of household.
Looking at the individual’s schooling and father’s schooling measures, the findings
are as predicted by Proposition1 and the conclusions concerning targeting are very
similar.
In the Appendix B we perform several robustness checks, including estimating a
linear probability model, clustering the standard errors at the neighborhood level,
changing the specification of the first stage model, excluding the households that
have defaulted on their MFI loan. Finally, we perform a placebo test, where the
treatment is defined as having knowledge of microfinance.
6 Conclusion
We propose a simple collective household choice model in which individual job
search in frictional labor markets depends on intra-household bargaining and on
access to finance. We show that the impact of access to finance on job search
intensity is ambiguous and depends on the interaction between the net-worth
and income effects. Moreover, the search intensity of the unemployed workers in
households with access to finance relative to those without access is increasing in
the individual’s bargaining power within the household.
Using several measures of individual intra-household bargaining power, we test
the predictions of our model using data collected by the authors in Cape Verde.
The data was collected to evaluate the impact of microfinance programs and,
therefore, the population of interest are poor households. Our assumptions are
general, but we believe that our findings are mostly relevant for poor households,
characterized by lack of capital and whose livelihood, in the absence of public
welfare schemes, is strongly influenced and supported by family ties. This is the
typical target of microfinance programs.
31This finding is interesting, as the household role is a clean measure of bargaining power.
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Linking access to finance to collective household decision making is important
when evaluating the impact of development programs since family links affect the
livelihood and the decision making process of the poor very strongly (Platteau,
1991, Fafchamps and Susan, 2003, Collins et al., 2009). Besides contributing
to the literature on collective decision making, our results also provide some
new and important policy implications for the design of microfinance programs.
Microfinance was primarily designed to promote self-employment in those areas
of the world where the poor have little or no opportunity to find a job. Our
results highlight the importance of rethinking the targeting of microfinance, since
relaxing credit constraints to poor households may have complementarities with
improved labor market outcomes but may also discourage the supply of wage
labor. Which effect prevails, depends on the targeting of loans.
We show that the behavior of unemployed household members is affected by
the access to credit in a non-trivial way, potentially undermining the positive
effects of microfinance. When poorly targeted, access to finance can lower the
incentives to search for work, making the overall impact on welfare ambiguous.
Our findings suggest that, to improve the impact of microfinance on labor market
outcomes, the screening should not be solely based on the characteristics of the
entrepreneurial activity and individual borrower, but also on characteristics of the
household she/he belongs to and, in particular, the within-household distribution
of decision power. We explore simple indicators of bargaining power that are
easy to measure and scrutinize. If they are used to improve targeting, they can
improve the impact of access to finance, generating positive externalities in terms
of labor market outcomes. A corollary is that to assess the impact of microfinance
programs, it is important to focus not only on the direct impact on borrowers,
but also on the indirect effects on other family members.
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A Taylor expansion of ∆ (Ce, Cn; t)
In the main text, we use the first order Taylor expansion of ∆ (Ce, Cn; t) around
the point
{C•e (t) , C•n (t)} =
{
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (t) , (1 + f (α))
−1 Yn (t)
}
.
This is given by
∆ (Ce, Cn; t) ≈ uˆ (C•e (t))− uˆ (C•n (t)) +
uˆ′ (C•e (t)) [Ce (t)− C•e (t)]− uˆ′ (C•n (t)) [Cn (t)− C•n (t)] ,
(A.1)
where
C•e (t) = C
•
n (t) = (1 + f (α))
−1 Yn (t) . (A.2)
Using the budget constraint (10) we have that
Cn (t) = (1 + f (α))
−1 Yn (t) = C•n (t) , (A.3)
Ce (t) = (1 + f (α))
−1 Ye (t)
=
{
C•e (1) + (1 + f (α))
−1 (1 + r)W, t = 1
C•e (0) + (1 + f (α))
−1W, t = 0
(A.4)
Using (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) to substitute in (A.1) yields
∆ (Ce, Cn; t) ≈
∆˜ (α; t) =

uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (1)
) [
(1 + f (α))−1 (1 + r)W
]
, t = 1
uˆ′
(
(1 + f (α))−1 Yn (0)
) [
(1 + f (α))−1W
]
, t = 0
(A.5)
which corresponds to equation (14) in the main text.
B Appendix: Robustness Tests
In this Appendix we investigate the robustness of our findings to: alternative
estimation model; alternative construction of the standard errors, changes in
model specification; changes in the sample. In particular, we estimate a linear
probability model, we try clustering the standard errors at the neighborhood level,
we change the specification of the first stage model, and we change the sample
by excluding the households that have defaulted on their MFI loan. Finally, we
perform a placebo test, where the treatment is defined as having knowledge of
microfinance.
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B.1 Linear Probability Model
As a first robustness check, we repeated the analysis using a linear probability
model (LPM), estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). If the true conditional
expectation function is unknown, it is helpful to contrast the LPM to the Probit
model (Wooldridge, 2010). The estimation results are reported in Table A1 and
the corresponding marginal effects in Figure A1. Comparing marginal effects, we
can see that for all measures of bargaining power considered, the significance and
general trends are very similar for both models.
B.2 Clustering of Standard Errors at the Neighborhood Level
Second, in Table A2 and Figure A2 we take into account the fact that the standard
errors may be correlated within neighborhoods. Clustering the standard errors
at the neighborhood level does not alter the results in any significant way.32
B.3 Alternative First Stage Model
Third, since ATT estimated with propensity score methods can be sensitive to
specifications of the matching model (see Smith and Todd, 2005, and Heckman
et al., 1998), we estimate the model using alternative sets of covariates in the first
stage.33 In particular, we include higher order variables (the square of household
size and number of children) and remove the neighborhood fixed effects. The
results of this alternative specification are displayed in Table A3 and Figure A3
and are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to our baseline specification.
B.4 Excluding Defaulting Households
As a fourth robustness check, we exclude from the sample the few households
which defaulted on their microfinance loans, which reduces our sample to 259
observations. Our motivation in doing this is to fully align the empirical analysis
with the assumptions of the theoretical model. In fact, in Section 2, we assume
that households know they have access to finance when deciding on the search
intensity. In our baseline specification, we took this into account by restricting
the sample to loans given since 2010. Now, we further refine the sample excluding
32In our main specification (Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3), we chose not to cluster standard
errors and only use neighborhood fixed effects since clustering can be misleading in the case
of few clusters (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Moreover, the fixed effects and control variables
should absorb most of the systematic within-cluster correlation (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
33Dehejia and Wahba (2002) advocate this type of checks in the absence of an experimental
benchmark estimate.
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the ‘bad’ clients. Since MFI usually have repeated interactions with their clients,
it is likely that recent clients and clients that did not default have much easier
access to microfinance.34 Reassuringly, the results are again consistent with our
baseline results and our theoretical prediction (see Table A4 and Figure A4).
B.5 Placebo Test
Finally, we perform a placebo test to evaluate whether the relationship we have
estimated is induced by some other mechanism underlying the characteristics of
our covariates and not by the mechanisms we have outlined. In particular, we
replace the dummy treatment variable MFI capturing the fact that households
had access to microfinance, by the dummy variable Heard about microfinance,
capturing whether households know what microfinance is. We expected this
placebo treatment not to have predictive power on the dependent variable, the
probability of Job Search. Table A5 and Figure A5 show that, as expected,
the placebo treatment, interacted with measures of bargaining power, has no
significant impact on the job search of the unemployed.
34Our definition of default (loan not repaid 3 months after the due date), is in general stricter
than the one used by Cape Verdean MFI in their operations. When deciding whether a clients
is eligible for more credit, soft information available to credit officers plays a crucial role, so
loans can be given out also to clients who repaid with significant, but “justified”, delays.
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Table A1: Access to microcredit and labor search: OLS regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI 0.034 −0.194* 0.091 −0.004 −0.469*** −0.591*** −0.185* −0.245**
(0.094) (0.116) (0.194) (0.111) (0.209) (0.165) (0.109) (0.115)
MFI × Household Size −0.042*
(0.023)
MFI × Female (dummy) −0.322**
(0.160)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.038**
(0.019)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 0.612***
(0.174)
MFI × Head (dummy) 0.351
(0.225)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 0.216**
(0.087)
Household size 0.040** 0.0203 0.040* 0.023 0.020 0.025 0.015 0.017
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020)
Female -0.194*** -0.116 -0.085 -0.005 -0.137* -0.0508 -0.102 -0.104
(0.065) (0.072) (0.075) (0.080) (0.076) (0.0711) (0.0714) (0.0736)
Schooling (years) 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.012 -0.007 0.007 0.009 -0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Father School (dummy) -0.005 -0.011 -0.050 -0.063 -0.018 -0.304*** -0.013 -0.101
(0.064) (0.078) (0.075) (0.085) (0.077) (0.091) (0.076) (0.079)
Head (dummy) -0.007 0.292** 0.334*** 0.260** 0.194 0.223** 0.168 0.243**
(0.097) (0.113) (0.115) (0.108) (0.130) (0.0981) (0.171) (0.107)
Unemp. duration: 7 - 12 m 0.259*** 0.025 0.013 0.060 0.154 0.086 0.035 0.148
(0.095) (0.113) (0.112) (0.102) (0.117) (0.114) (0.111) (0.112)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.168** 0.095 0.092 0.132 0.095 0.137 0.081 0.126
(0.068) (0.085) (0.082) (0.083) (0.087) (0.093) (0.085) (0.093)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y -0.181** -0.102 -0.099 -0.094 -0.101 -0.108 -0.138 -0.081
(0.081) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) (0.112) (0.106) (0.110) (0.116)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R-squared 0.346 0.623 0.630 0.634 0.638 0.668 0.630 0.644
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts
with family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level
controls: Age, Age2, Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Ownership of Bank Account
(dummy) and an indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Table A2: Access to credit and labor search: Clustering at neighborhood level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI 0.026 -0.932** 0.830 -0.279 -2.097*** -2.868*** -0.905* -1.024**
(0.284) (0.455) (0.752) (0.463) (0.768) (0.549) (0.534) (0.400)
MFI × Household Size -0.268**
(0.108)
MFI × Female (dummy) -1.002**
(0.504)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.179**
(0.076)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 2.906***
(0.563)
MFI × Head (dummy) 2.559***
(0.957)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 0.981***
(0.305)
Household size 0.155** 0.183** 0.319*** 0.170** 0.167** 0.165* 0.146* 0.133*
(0.062) (0.082) (0.085) (0.084) (0.075) (0.089) (0.077) (0.078)
Female -0.706*** -0.480 -0.298 -0.106 -0.566 -0.513 -0.445 -0.476
(0.155) (0.333) (0.380) (0.307) (0.361) (0.399) (0.286) (0.360)
Schooling (years) -0.002 0.054 0.046 0.064 -0.035 0.063 0.035 0.007
(0.025) (0.047) (0.043) (0.040) (0.054) (0.045) (0.046) (0.050)
Father School (dummy) -0.035 -0.293 -0.470 -0.320 -0.250 -1.621*** -0.307 -0.586*
(0.290) (0.317) (0.360) (0.340) (0.294) (0.332) (0.329) (0.304)
Head (dummy) -0.055 0.935** 1.162*** 0.824** 0.722* 0.642 0.526 0.755*
(0.255) (0.392) (0.412) (0.361) (0.387) (0.424) (0.446) (0.398)
Unemp. duration: 7 - 12 m 0.868** 0.814 0.670 0.837* 1.070*** 0.986** 0.784* 1.128***
(0.353) (0.527) (0.572) (0.469) (0.406) (0.427) (0.449) (0.412)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.612* 0.516 0.415 0.562 0.470 0.691** 0.438 0.619*
(0.339) (0.392) (0.430) (0.346) (0.405) (0.338) (0.414) (0.347)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y -0.645* -0.317 -0.388 -0.330 -0.398 -0.324 -0.471 -0.290
(0.359) (0.570) (0.556) (0.543) (0.567) (0.516) (0.576) (0.536)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R-squared 0.306 0.584 0.598 0.591 0.602 0.642 0.598 0.607
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts
with family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level
controls: Age, Age2, Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Ownership of Bank Account
(dummy) and an indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Table A3: Alternative specification of the first stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI 0.00886 -0.660 0.884 -0.146 -1.625** -1.870*** -0.573 -0.776*
(0.306) (0.431) (0.789) (0.512) (0.713) (0.596) (0.433) (0.422)
MFI × Household Size -0.246**
(0.100)
MFI × Female (dummy) -0.844
(0.622)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.136**
(0.068)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 1.814***
(0.611)
MFI × Head (dummy) 2.848**
(1.129)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 0.660*
(0.352)
Household size 0.132** 0.263*** 0.396*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.299*** 0.225** 0.263***
(0.057) (0.081) (0.106) (0.095) (0.091) (0.094) (0.090) (0.0942)
Female -0.703*** -0.499 -0.202 -0.0991 -0.429 -0.417 -0.404 -0.383
(0.206) (0.312) (0.365) (0.382) (0.342) (0.335) (0.345) (0.340)
Schooling (years) 0.017 0.069 0.049 0.069 -0.006 0.052 0.037 0.027
(0.029) (0.044) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048)
Father School (dummy) -0.0585 -0.365 -0.383 -0.225 -0.219 -0.860** -0.175 -0.395
(0.205) (0.268) (0.280) (0.281) (0.279) (0.343) (0.279) (0.298)
Head (dummy) -0.091 0.739 0.961** 0.697 0.585 0.636 0.239 0.694
(0.292) (0.450) (0.450) (0.447) (0.495) (0.433) (0.547) (0.456)
Unemp. duration: 7 - 12 m 0.882*** 0.919** 0.658 0.835** 0.887** 0.951** 0.764* 0.968**
(0.321) (0.418) (0.424) (0.408) (0.427) (0.434) (0.424) (0.439)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.553*** 1.026*** 0.919*** 1.043*** 0.983*** 1.142*** 1.004*** 1.067***
(0.214) (0.313) (0.305) (0.315) (0.319) (0.341) (0.322) (0.335)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y -0.655*** -0.296 -0.375 -0.398 -0.424 -0.252 -0.497 -0.327
(0.247) (0.330) (0.325) (0.330) (0.335) (0.348) (0.339) (0.348)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R-squared 0.323 0.638 0.660 0.654 0.659 0.672 0.662 0.659
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts with
family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level controls:
Age, Age2, Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Ownership of Bank Account (dummy) and an
indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Table A4: Microfinance and job search excluding households who defaulted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MFI -0.0397 -0.804** 0.908 -0.187 -1.497** -2.261*** -0.861** -0.871**
(0.315) (0.405) (0.806) (0.447) (0.715) (0.607) (0.400) (0.412)
MFI × Household Size -0.252**
(0.099)
MFI × Female (dummy) -0.928
(0.567)
MFI × Schooling (years) 0.101
(0.071)
MFI × Father School (dummy) 2.025***
(0.639)
MFI × Head (dummy) 1.827**
(0.761)
MFI × Bargaining Power PC 0.396
(0.350)
Household size 0.164** 0.150* 0.265*** 0.140* 0.139* 0.151* 0.137* 0.129
(0.067) (0.086) (0.097) (0.084) (0.083) (0.085) (0.083) (0.0863)
Female -0.711*** -0.411 -0.276 -0.063 -0.470 -0.484 -0.388 -0.422
(0.216) (0.316) (0.320) (0.313) (0.316) (0.306) (0.310) (0.313)
Schooling (years) -0.004 0.019 0.018 0.029 -0.025 0.043 0.012 0.004
(0.031) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Father School (dummy) -0.059 -0.813*** -0.908*** -0.814*** -0.750** -1.511*** -0.828*** -0.867***
(0.219) (0.305) (0.298) (0.294) (0.310) (0.383) (0.304) (0.306)
Head (dummy) -0.057 0.618 0.764* 0.528 0.550 0.562 0.357 0.587
(0.314) (0.459) (0.441) (0.454) (0.466) (0.449) (0.482) (0.462)
Unemp. duration: 7 - 12 m 0.849*** 0.786 0.633 0.800* 0.941* 0.917* 0.793 0.911*
(0.328) (0.512) (0.499) (0.483) (0.493) (0.494) (0.491) (0.504)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.583** 0.286 0.203 0.323 0.272 0.511 0.217 0.356
(0.228) (0.341) (0.324) (0.324) (0.336) (0.345) (0.333) (0.351)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y -0.667** -0.765** -0.840** -0.788** -0.752** -0.556 -0.850** -0.688*
(0.262) (0.349) (0.351) (0.344) (0.352) (0.357) (0.354) (0.365)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
Pseudo R-squared 0.303 0.494 0.513 0.501 0.501 0.518 0.505 0.498
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts with
family abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level controls:
Age, Age2, Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Ownership of Bank Account (dummy) and
an indicator for whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Table A5: Placebo test: Impact of Having heard about Microfinance on labor search
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Heard about MF 0.142 0.0979 -0.305 -0.202 0.884 0.580 0.104 0.0722
(0.226) (0.333) (0.728) (0.513) (0.700) (0.683) (0.352) (0.340)
Heard about MF × Household Size 0.060
(0.099)
Heard about MF × Female 0.448
(0.600)
Heard about MF × Education -0.131
(0.089)
Heard about MF × Father School (dummy) -0.732
(0.803)
Heard of MF × Head (dummy) -0.065
(0.653)
Heard of MF × Bargaining Power PC -0.404
(0.332)
Household size 0.152** 0.180** 0.133 0.187** 0.195** 0.165* 0.180** 0.204**
(0.066) (0.092) (0.118) (0.093) (0.097) (0.094) (0.092) (0.098)
Female -0.717*** -0.287 -0.281 -0.634 -0.275 -0.336 -0.286 -0.434
(0.214) (0.343) (0.346) (0.496) (0.343) (0.357) (0.346) (0.377)
Schooling (years) -0.002 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.154* 0.047 0.041 0.088
(0.031) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.082) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057)
Father school (dummy) -0.052 -0.213 -0.179 -0.203 -0.222 0.313 -0.213 0.022
(0.216) (0.302) (0.311) (0.298) (0.300) (0.675) (0.303) (0.374)
Head (dummy) -0.053 1.160*** 1.162*** 1.152*** 1.185*** 1.129** 1.221** 0.802
(0.312) (0.448) (0.446) (0.446) (0.449) (0.451) (0.574) (0.517)
Unemp. duration: 7 - 12 m 0.885*** 0.798 0.779 0.785 0.841 0.729 0.799 0.782
(0.323) (0.543) (0.555) (0.553) (0.556) (0.539) (0.542) (0.547)
Unemp. duration: 1 to 4 y 0.603*** 0.433 0.443 0.465 0.447 0.361 0.433 0.408
(0.230) (0.324) (0.329) (0.326) (0.330) (0.327) (0.324) (0.320)
Unemp. duration: > 4 y -0.637** -0.551 -0.574 -0.524 -0.522 -0.613* -0.551 -0.546
(0.253) (0.357) (0.368) (0.355) (0.359) (0.354) (0.357) (0.355)
Other hh. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other ind. level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Inv probability weighting no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Pseudo R-squared 0.307 0.569 0.570 0.570 0.572 0.571 0.569 0.571
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Additional household level controls: House ownership (dummy), Number of household members<15, Contacts with family
abroad (dummy) and Number of times per week reads journal (dummy). Additional individual level controls: Age, Age2,
Origin, Parent Self-Employed (dummy), Number of children, Ownership of Bank Account (dummy) and an indicator for
whether the member received the loan (dummy).
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Figure A1: Average marginal effects in the linear probability model
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Figure A2: Average marginal effects with clustering at neighborhood level
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Figure A3: Alternative specification of the first stage
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Figure A4: Average marginal effects excluding households who defaulted
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Figure A5: Average marginal effects of Having heard about MF
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